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The Differential Empowering Effects of
Europeanization on the Autonomy of
National Agencies
TOBIAS BACH,* EVA RUFFING,** and KUTSAL YESILKAGIT***
This article examines the influence of Europeanization on the relationship
between ministries and agencies at the national level. The core argument
is that the differentiated nature of the international environment (with
policy development often transferred to the international level and policy
implementation left at the national level) transforms national agencies
into policy-developing actors that shape policies without being directly
influenced by their national political principals. The increasingly common
involvement of national agencies in European policymaking processes
thereby increases these agencies’ policy-development autonomy but does
not change their role in policy implementation. We examine this argument
by testing an innovative hypothesis—the differentiation hypothesis—on a
combined data set of German and Dutch national agencies. Our empirical
findings support the hypothesis in both countries, suggesting that similar
effects can be expected in other contexts in which semiautonomous agencies
are involved in transnational policymaking.
Introduction
The ongoing process of European integration has resulted in a differen-
tiation of the policy process: Whereas policymaking is being increasingly
transferred to the European level to address cross-border policy problems,
such as the regulation of financial markets and the promotion of trans-
European energy grids, the implementation of these policies, in the
strict sense of the term, remains within the competence of the member
states and their administrative systems (Hofmann and Türk 2007; Versluis
2008). However, the character of these administrative systems has also
changed. In the past 20 years, the proliferation of semiautonomous agen-
cies at arm’s length from elected politicians has fundamentally trans-
formed national modes of governance (Christensen and Lægreid 2003;
Pierre and Peters 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Verhoest et al. 2010).
Whereas delegation to semiautonomous agencies has been furthered for
efficiency gains and reasons of credible commitment to long-term policy
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goals, it also leads to the fragmentation of the administrative system,
which goes hand in hand with problems of political control, accountabil-
ity, and policy coordination (Bogdanor 2006; Christensen and Lægreid
2007). European integration and agencification have together enabled
national agencies to play a pivotal role in transnational administra-
tive networks, allowing them to handle cross-border policy problems
(Eberlein and Newman 2008) since they possess the expertise and
technological skills to address these often wicked problems. Hence,
the emergence of transnational administrative networks has opened up
institutional playing fields outside the boundaries of the national state
(Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004).
A number of recent empirical studies indicate that national agencies’
participation in transnational networks challenges entrenched national
actor constellations by empowering the agencies vis-à-vis their parent
ministries (Bach and Ruffing 2013; Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2013; Egeberg
2006; Newman 2008; Yesilkagit 2011). This article argues that the differen-
tiated nature of the European Union (EU) policy process, in which policy
development is transferred to the European level and policy implemen-
tation is left at the national level, has a differentiated effect on the relation-
ship between national agencies that participate in EU decision making and
their parent ministries. To explore this effect, we use a multidimensional
concept of agency autonomy, differentiating between autonomy in the
phase of policy development and autonomy in the phase of policy imple-
mentation (Niklasson and Pierre 2012; Painter and Yee 2011). The differen-
tiation hypothesis proposed in this article suggests that Europeanization
(i.e., agency participation in EU networks) strengthens national agencies’
position in national policymaking, that is, their policy-development
autonomy, rather than their autonomy in policy implementation. The main
theoretical explanation is that EU networking provides national agencies
with both expert and negotiation knowledge in a multilevel decision
process, which is relevant for policy development, but hardly affects
ministry–agency relations in policy implementation. Additionally, the
direct involvement in supranational policymaking processes is assumed to
produce spillover effects on the agencies’ role in the domestic setting. In
contrast, we argue that the implementation of EU policies by national
agencies is little different from the implementation of national policies, in
which agencies are characterized by generally high degrees of autonomy
(Verhoest et al. 2010).
To make the differentiation argument more robust, we propose a
context hypothesis, according to which we also expect a varying effect
of Europeanization across different national contexts. Following the
organizational perspective deployed by Morten Egeberg and his associ-
ates (Egeberg and Trondal 2009a), we argue that certain structural
characteristics—that is, the existence of semiautonomous agencies at the
national level and their involvement in differentiated European policy
processes—will yield similar results, regardless of the national context in
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which these agencies are rooted. This argument must be tested against the
concurring approach that different patterns of agency reforms might
have a moderating effect on the relationship between Europeanization
and agency autonomy. For example, New Public Management (NPM)–
inspired agencification might have triggered a more substantial demand
for autonomy by the agencies, especially in terms of policy implementa-
tion. To ensure a conclusive test for our context hypothesis, we chose two
countries that are founding members of the EU and share broadly similar
administrative traditions (Painter and Peters 2010) but differ with respect
to the variable under consideration (i.e., patterns of agency reforms),
namely, Germany and the Netherlands. Whereas the Netherlands has
pursued a deliberate policy of hiving off agencies out of ministries since
the 1990s (Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008), Germany has a long tradition of
semiautonomous agencies (Bach and Jann 2010).
The empirical data are drawn from an international survey database of
public sector agencies, allowing us to include a number of control vari-
ables in the statistical models. The empirical results support the theoretical
assumptions concerning a differentiated and robust effect of European-
ization on agency autonomy: In both countries, Europeanization has a
statistically significant effect on the policy-development autonomy of
national agencies but not on their policy-implementation autonomy,
thereby changing the traditional roles of agencies in the policy process.
This article contributes to three broad streams of discussion: First, we
contribute to the discussion on agency autonomy in the national context,
which has hitherto not systematically considered transnationalization as
an explanatory variable (see, however, Pollitt 2006). Second, we discuss
Europeanization and European networks. In comparison to prevailing
studies, we do not confine ourselves to network effects alone but also look
at the estimated effects of agency participation in, for example, Council of
Ministers or Comitology Committees. Another distinguishing feature of
this article is that we do not estimate the effects of Europeanization solely on
regulatory agencies but also on executive agencies. Since EU governance is
leaning toward regulatory administration, many observers tend to narrow
their focus to this area. Third, our results contribute to the discussion on
international administrative networks in general. There is hardly any
empirical work on transgovernmental networks outside the EU. The dif-
ferentiation hypothesis is based on assumptions on special characteristics
of policymaking and policy implementation in the EU. Since many of these
characteristics are shared by other international organizations, our results
could be the basis for hypothesis formulation with regard to administrative
networks in the context of other international organizations.
The Effects of Europeanization on National Administrations
The main theoretical question of this article is to what extent the transfer
of public policy from the national to the European level in various areas
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affects the relationship between politics and administration within the
national state. Our main focus is hence on how core national polity features
are affected through the process of European integration. In the diffuse
discussion on Europeanization concepts, we follow approaches that con-
ceptualize Europeanization as the proceeding of European integration
(Page and Wouters 1995; Sandholtz 1996) and operationalize Europeaniza-
tion as the degree to which an agency is involved at the European level.
This use of Europeanization as an independent variable is in contrast to
other approaches that employ Europeanization as a dependent variable
that describes either the impact of European integration on policies and
institutional structures or the ongoing processes of change induced by the
European project (Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2003).
Although having correctly predicted that Europeanization has an
empowering effect on certain institutional and sectoral actors but not on
others and that it is thereby capable of changing the political game at the
domestic level, the first studies that put the Europeanization effect on the
academic agenda envisioned a top-down, one-directional model (Börzel
and Risse 2000; Héritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996; Knill and Lenschow
1998). These studies, moreover, were far more concerned with how Euro-
peanization affects national policymaking and policy outcomes as
opposed to how Europeanization affects the machinery of government
(one of the main arenas of national policymaking).
Following this first generation of Europeanization studies, several
studies came to focus on national administrations. This research is quite
diverse and comprises studies of changes in the structure and organiza-
tion of national administrative systems (Knill 2001; Ruffing forthcoming),
changes in the beliefs and role conceptions of national administrative
actors (Egeberg 1999; Geuijen et al. 2008), the share and amount of time
national ministries and individual civil servants devote to EU-related work
(Mastenbroek and Princen 2010; Müller et al. 2010), and finally, the impact
of Europeanization on national ministries and agencies across different
levels of national administration and policy sectors (Egeberg and Trondal
1999; Lægreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson 2004). Like the first-
generation Europeanization studies, these studies share an examination of
changes in the patterns of behavior and practices within central govern-
ment organizations of EU-affiliated and member states as an effect of
Europeanization. Moreover, they focus on changes within government
organizations and not specifically on changes in the relationships between
national-level government organizations.
The study of Europeanization effects on relationships between govern-
ment organizations within national administrative systems was kicked off
by the work of Egeberg (2006) and his associates. Central to their work is
the view that strengthening the European Commission as the EU’s execu-
tive center and agencification at the national level has been fundamental to
the burgeoning of a European networked order that blurs the lines
between the supranational and national levels of governance. Like many
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other students of European governance, these authors have shown that
(European and national) agencies have become central players in almost
all facets of the policy process (Coen and Thatcher 2008; Eberlein and
Newman 2008). An important contribution of Egeberg and associates is
that the involvement of agencies is not just a matter of “dual” or “double
delegation,” that is, the formal, simultaneous empowerment of national
agencies by both the Commission and national governments, but of
“double hattedness”: National agencies simultaneously form part of both
the administration of the EU and of (their own) national administrations
(Egeberg and Trondal 2009a).
This line of research has triggered a number of empirical studies on
how participation in the EU administrative order affects the national-level
relationship between agencies and ministries. Abraham Newman (2008)
showed that national agencies, by pooling their expertise and administra-
tive resources via a transnational network, have been able to defy their
parent ministries and the European Commission when these actors were
hesitant to impose regulations on the storage and use of personal data
within the EU. Kutsal Yesilkagit (2011) discovered that not only did the
expertise gained through participation in an EU network increase the
autonomy of national agencies, but that EU prescriptions laid down in
the Privacy Directive concerning the functioning and embedding of
national competent authorities within the national administrative system
also enhanced the bureaucratic autonomy of the Data Protection Authority
in the Netherlands. For Germany, Tobias Bach and Eva Ruffing (2013)
found that the involvement of agencies in various stages of the EU
policy process has a positive effect on national agencies’ policy autonomy
vis-à-vis their parent ministries. Finally, studying the effects of the
European Competition Network on national competition authorities
in three countries, Ole Danielsen and Kutsal Yesilkagit (2013) revealed
that a European network interacts differently in distinct national institu-
tional settings, varying from a reassertion of the existing national order
to a differentiation between an agency’s national (less autonomy) and
international (more autonomy) activities.
Hypotheses
Building further on these insights, this article aims to test two new
hypotheses. The first is the differentiation thesis, which is founded upon the
differentiated nature of the EU policy process and the position of national
agencies therein. The EU is, in large part, a supranational political system,
yet policymaking is more “supranationalized” than is policy implemen-
tation. This article conceptualizes implementation in its strict sense,
encompassing only measures “transforming general policy intent into an
array of rules, routines and social processes that can convert policy inten-
tion into action” (O’Toole 2007, 142) and excluding any kind of lawmak-
ing, such as Comitology decisions (often referred to as “implementing
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measures”) or transposition of European law. While policymaking
competences are currently being shifted from the national to the European
level in more and more policy domains, the idea that European law be
implemented by the member states remains a guiding legal principle
(Hofmann and Türk 2007; Versluis 2008). This principle is in line with the
subsidiarity principle, which states that all competences should lie at the
lowest level at which the political objectives can be efficiently achieved.
Therefore, the implementation (in the sense of “putting into practice”) of
EU legislation usually does not differ from the implementation of national
legislation.
The EU consists of a number of varied venues, rules, and procedures for
integrating national agencies into the European policymaking process.
European agency networks, Commission expert committees, a host of
consultation procedures, and sometimes also Council working groups
allow representatives of national agencies to participate in policy advisory
and policymaking processes at the EU level. In many of these processes,
agency networks have a role as agenda-setters. Some of these networks
also have a role in actual implementation, particularly via a “soft,” that is,
nonbinding coordination of national implementation processes. Therefore,
“[i]mplementation on the European level through direct administration is
the exception to indirect administration by the Member States” (Hofmann
and Türk 2007, 253). In other words, at the European level, national agen-
cies engage in the making of hard law, but (with few exceptions) only in a
soft coordination of implementing it at the national level. Whereas policy
implementation is traditionally the task of agencies, policy development is
a core task of ministries. The implementation of EU legislation by national
agencies can therefore be expected to have little effect on existing patterns
of ministry–agency relations.
To answer the question of what kinds of effects we expect, we need to
develop assumptions on how Europeanization impacts the relationship
between ministries and agencies. We therefore refer to the principal–
agent approach, a well-established theoretical framework for analyzing
ministry–agency relationships. The main issue that principals have to deal
with in existing principal–agent relationships is information asymmetry
inherent in any such relationship (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast
1989). Involvement in European networks may exacerbate the problem of
information asymmetry. By becoming involved in such networks, the
agency enters a new world. Its actions in these networks can be only
partially monitored by the ministry by enforcing tight (and costly) report-
ing obligations. This means that even if the agent is not acting in bad faith,
a (partial) loss of control is inevitable (Mayntz 1979) because of informa-
tion asymmetry and remoteness of decision making.
Furthermore, the agency gains several types of very valuable knowl-
edge. On the one hand, it gains privileged access to the knowledge and
expertise of other network participants. On the other hand, it gains nego-
tiation knowledge, meaning that only the actors participating directly in
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the network are able to assess which positions are held by the other
participants and which compromises have, in fact, been feasible. Agencies
are therefore in a comfortable position to potentially influence European
negotiations according to their own preferences. All in all, agencies
involved in European networks might be able to “bypass” their parent
ministries (Egeberg 2006) because their own influence on policymaking
is not mediated by the ministry, as is usually the case in national
policymaking.
From a theoretical point of view, this effect is assumed to be stronger
with regard to policy-development autonomy than to implementation
autonomy. In policy implementation, the discretion of a national agency
cannot be widened by additional expert knowledge obtained on the
European scene. However, this knowledge might affect the way an
agency uses its discretion, for example, if an agency learns about best
practices in other countries. Negotiation knowledge might also have a
limited value because agreements regarding national implementation
are usually not binding, and successful negotiation is therefore less
important.
In contrast, policy development is at least partly transferred to the
European level. Here, agency networks are often the hub of solution-
finding and compromising. These decisions usually have to be “ratified”
by other actors, for example, Comitology Committees staffed by represen-
tatives of the national ministries. Nevertheless, agency networks are influ-
ential agenda-setters. This means that negotiation knowledge becomes a
valuable resource in the decision-making process. Furthermore, as far as
expert knowledge is concerned, the fact that the task of policy develop-
ment is also fulfilled at the European level gives the agency the chance
to exploit the increasing information asymmetry by “bypassing” the
ministry in the manner described above. Therefore, our hypothesis is
that agencies might gain policy-development autonomy but not policy-
implementation autonomy when becoming involved in European
networks.
Hypothesis 1: The involvement of national agencies in the EU policy process positively
affects the policy-development autonomy of national agencies yet has no effect on
policy-implementation autonomy.
The second hypothesis focuses on the robustness of the differentiation
hypothesis across politico-administrative contexts. We know from com-
parative studies on administrative legacies that agency reforms have
sprung from “many houses” and that trajectories of agency reforms have
been influenced by path dependencies (Painter and Peters 2010; Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2011). Most importantly, some countries (e.g., Germany) have a
long tradition of delegation to semiautonomous agencies, whereas others
(e.g., the Netherlands) have only more recently set up executive agencies,
either along the lines of modern agencies inspired by NPM or following
the template of independent regulatory agencies (Bach and Jann 2010;
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Verhoest et al. 2012). A number of studies point to the interaction between
the operation and structure of EU networks and the national context
of agencies, demonstrating that prevailing models of ministry–agency
relations affect the agencies’ role in EU networks (Danielsen and
Yesilkagit 2013; Egeberg 2006). However, even though these studies indi-
cate that ministerial control patterns of agencies’ EU activities largely
follow established modes of operation, they also consistently reveal an
“autonomizing” effect on national agencies. This literature is in line with
our structural argument that involvement in European networks opens up
the possibility of bypassing parent ministries in European policymaking
and makes the chain of control brittle, regardless of the national contexts
these agencies are rooted in. This leads us to the context hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Europeanization has a differentiated effect on agency autonomy,
irrespective of national agency traditions and trajectories of agency reforms.
Data and Methods
The empirical data for this research were gathered through standardized
surveys of senior managers of national agencies in the context of the
COBRA (Comparative Public Organization Data Base for Research and
Analysis) research network. The German survey was conducted in 2008
among a total population of N = 122 federal agencies with a response rate
of 60% (N = 73). The sample population is representative of the total popu-
lation with regard to organizational type, ministry affiliation, and agency
size.1 The federal administration comprises two main legal types of agen-
cies: Semiautonomous agencies have a direct hierarchical relationship
with their parent ministry, whereas legally independent agencies have a
more remote formal relationship with ministries that usually excludes
ministerial meddling in agency decisions (see Bach and Jann 2010 for more
details).
The Dutch survey was conducted in 2006 with a total population of
N = 621 and a response rate of 38% (N = 219). The sample is representative
of the population of national agencies with regard to organizational type.2
The Dutch administrative landscape harbors four types of organizations:
executive agencies, independent administrative bodies, government
foundations, and public bodies with a legal personality. Executive agen-
cies operate under the direct control of the ministry but enjoy autonomy
regarding personnel and financial policies. The other types enjoy more
formal autonomy from the ministry, but the legal basis on which they
were founded differs among one another (i.e., public vs. private law) (see
Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008).
The questionnaires were distributed to the agency chief executives,
who were asked to answer the survey on behalf of the entire organiza-
tion. Although surveys of top managers are routinely used in public
administration research, they potentially produce a biased picture of the
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organization. Therefore, surveys covering staff at different hierarchical
levels are suggested to provide a more accurate picture of different
organizational views (Enticott, Boyne, and Walker 2009). However, this
approach is laden with difficulties concerning how to aggregate the dif-
ferent views and potentially lower sample size since valid observations
from all relevant organizational levels are required. Most importantly,
the substantial focus of this article is on relationships with other
organizations—especially parent ministries, sister agencies, and govern-
ing bodies of the EU. Hence, we assume chief executives to be the most
knowledgeable respondents to assess these relationships for an entire
organization.
The surveys included several items measuring different dimensions of
the Europeanization of national agencies’ activities (Table 1). These items
were drawn from a survey of individual bureaucrats in the Netherlands
(Geuijen et al. 2008; Mastenbroek and Princen 2010) that covers both a
sectoral and an intergovernmental logic of national agencies’ European-
ization (Bach and Ruffing 2013). The sectoral logic is measured via the
participation of agency representatives in meetings arranged by the EU
Commission and via the practice of informal consultations with “sister
agencies” in other EU countries. The intergovernmental logic is measured
by the preparation of national input for EU meetings, the transposition of
EU legislation to national legislation, and the implementation of policies
based on EU legislation. In the exercise of these activities agencies support
their parent ministries, which usually take the lead in EU negotiations and
the transposition of EU law. Moreover, the items cover the main stages of
the EU policymaking process, that is, policy formulation (items 1–3 in
TABLE 1
Europeanization of National Agencies (Two-Country Data Set)
N Min Max Mean SD
1. Participation in meetings arranged by the
EU Commission
212 1 5 1.80 1.157
2. Informal consultations with colleagues
from other EU countries
212 1 5 2.58 1.430
3. Preparation of national input for EU
meetings
211 1 5 2.05 1.237
4. Transposition of EU legislation to national
legislation
210 1 5 1.90 1.193
5. Implementation or monitoring of national
legislation based on EU directives
210 1 5 2.38 1.463
6. Index based on (1) to (5) 209 5 25 10.67 5.349
Note: The following answer categories were used for the items measuring Europeanization:
1 = not at all/does not apply; 2 = to a small extent; 3 = partly; 4 = to a large extent; 5 = to a
very large extent.
SD, standard deviation.
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Table 1) and the transposition and implementation of EU legislation (items
4–5). For the analysis, an unweighted, additive index of Europeanization
based on these five items is used (α = 0.882 for the two-country data set).
The high internal consistency of the index indicates substantial overlap of
the national agencies’ exposure to different phases of EU decision making
(Bach and Ruffing 2013; Mastenbroek and Princen 2010).
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are summarized in
Table 2, which only includes cases with valid observations for the Europe-
anization index.3 We use separate measures of policy-implementation and
policy-development autonomy, thereby allowing for an empirical test
of the differentiation hypothesis. We measure policy-implementation
autonomy as the degree of agency discretion (i.e., the absence of ministry
involvement) with regard to the choice of policy instruments and target
group (e.g., setting priorities concerning which industry should be tar-
geted by control activities). While these are merely general measures of
agency discretion, they are appropriate given the heterogeneity of the
survey population. Additionally, these are measures of de facto agency
autonomy as perceived by the agencies’ senior management. The use of
perceived autonomy as a proximate measure of de facto autonomy is a
widely acknowledged approach in the literature (Niklasson and Pierre
2012; Painter and Yee 2011; Verhoest et al. 2012). The assumption is that
senior managers are in a very good position to make a reliable judgment
on de facto agency autonomy, and that perceived levels of autonomy
provide “insights about the room for manoeuvre that senior managers
think they have, and hence about the actual functioning of agencies”
(Verhoest et al. 2010, 47).4 The analysis is performed using a joint data set
including data from both countries. However, instead of using an additive
index, separate models for each subdimension of policy-implementation
autonomy are estimated.5
For policy-development autonomy, broadly similar measures were
used in the surveys, but unfortunately, they are not directly comparable.
TABLE 2
Dependent Variables
N Min Max Mean SD
Implementation autonomy: choice of policy
instruments (6-point scale, two-country
data set)
166 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.256
Implementation autonomy: choice of target
group (6-point scale, two-country data set)
177 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.262
Policy-development autonomy (5-point
scale, Germany)
69 1.00 5.00 2.65 1.027
Policy-development autonomy (5-point
scale, the Netherlands)
119 1.00 5.00 3.41 1.210
SD, standard deviation.
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Therefore, we conducted separate analyses per country to study the effects
of Europeanization on policy-development autonomy. This method still
allows us to test the context hypothesis according to which Europeaniza-
tion should affect agency policy autonomy, irrespective of national pat-
terns of agencification. Although parliamentary systems of government
are generally characterized by strong norms of separating policy formu-
lation and implementation, agency involvement in policy formulation is
fairly common. However, these activities are by and large channeled
toward the parent ministries, which thereby maintain a crucial gate-
keeping role in terms of agencies’ policy-development autonomy (Bach
2012). For Germany, we use the degree to which agencies can make policy
proposals as a measure of policy-development autonomy. This item is
positively and significantly correlated with other measures of policy-
development autonomy used in the German survey (see Bach 2010; Bach
and Ruffing 2013 for additional measures).6 For the Netherlands, we use
a variable that measures the extent to which an agency is involved in
developing new policies.7
In addition to our measurement of Europeanization, several control
variables are included into the models. We explicitly selected control vari-
ables that are assumed to have a substantial effect on perceived agency
autonomy and that have been tested empirically in similar studies (Bach
2010, 2012; Niklasson and Pierre 2012; Painter and Yee 2011; Pollitt 2006;
Verhoest et al. 2010; Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008). The control variables
include the national context, formal structure, task characteristics, and
cultural characteristics.
To control for context characteristics, fixed country effects are included
in the policy-implementation autonomy models. According to the context
hypothesis, Europeanization induces higher levels of agency autonomy,
irrespective of country-specific patterns of agencification or enduring
characteristics of the politico-administrative context. However, we may
expect country differences regarding overall levels of agency autonomy
(Pollitt 2006; Verhoest et al. 2010).
In terms of structural variables, the models take into consideration that
public sector organizations may be located at different positions on a
“quango continuum” characterized by varying degrees of hierarchical
oversight and public financing (Flinders, van Thiel, and Greve 1999). More
precisely, we distinguish between semiautonomous agencies without
legal independence on the one hand and different types of legally inde-
pendent organizations such as statutory bodies and foundations on the
other (van Thiel 2012). In contrast to semiautonomous agencies, legally
independent organizations frequently have a governing board, which is
assumed to protect the agency’s chief executive from political interference
(Christensen 2001). Additionally, legally independent organizations are
usually protected from comprehensive political oversight, which is
not the case for semiautonomous agencies. Finally, we distinguish
between single organizations operating on a country-wide basis and
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“group organizations” performing similar tasks in a limited geographical
area (Verhoest et al. 2010). National organizations may be more likely
to be directly involved in EU administrative networks than group
organizations.
The analysis also takes into consideration that agency task will affect the
agency’s relationship with its parent ministry (Painter and Yee 2011; Pollitt
2006; Verhoest et al. 2010). First, we distinguish between regulation, other
types of exercising public authority, and general public services as generic
task characteristics (Verhoest et al. 2010, 94–97 for an overview).8 In the
literature, regulatory agencies are generally considered to have substantial
discretion in terms of policy implementation, which is usually attributed
to their formal independence (Verhoest et al. 2010). However, not all regu-
latory agencies are equally autonomous in a formal sense (Gilardi 2002),
and formal autonomy alone is insufficient to explain de facto agency
autonomy (Maggetti 2007). However, few scholars actually compare regu-
latory agencies with agencies that have other tasks in terms of their (per-
ceived) de facto autonomy. Politicians may be more reluctant to interfere
with regulatory agencies’ activities in order to convince market actors of
policy stability and unbiased policy implementation (Niklasson and
Pierre 2012). The second task variable (“other types of exercising public
authority”) covers agencies whose activities are usually bound by detailed
regulations, such as the administration of financial benefits. In the litera-
ture, these agencies are expected to have low degrees of discretion
(Verhoest et al. 2010). Finally, agencies that provide “general public ser-
vices” should seek high levels of discretion and “have a high interest in
becoming involved in policy formulation to ensure that operational con-
siderations are taken into account” (Bach 2012, 214). In addition to task
characteristics, we control for the policy sector since the process of Euro-
pean integration by and large focuses on economic policy (i.e., the creation
of a single market), whereas social and welfare policies are generally the
domain of the member states.9 Finally, we include agency budget as a
control variable, which is considered a proxy for political salience (Pollitt
2006). According to large-scale empirical research, agency officials pay
more attention to the preferences of the political leadership under condi-
tions of high political salience (Egeberg and Trondal 2009b). Moreover,
because of a usually high correlation between agency budget and staff
numbers, budget is a useful control variable for an agency’s structural
capacity to become involved in EU policymaking.
Finally, we include agency age as a control variable in terms of cultural
characteristics. According to historical-institutionalist reasoning, agencies
will reflect the dominant norms and values of their creation period, and
these may persist under changing conditions, such as NPM reforms
(Niklasson and Pierre 2012). Moreover, agencies will become infused
with their own characteristic norms and values over time, which may
strengthen their position vis-à-vis their parent department (Verhoest et al.
2010). Additionally, Maggetti’s (2007) findings on the determinants of
12 TOBIAS BACH, EVA RUFFING, AND KUTSAL YESILKAGIT
de facto agency autonomy indicate that network membership turns out to
be a significant determinant of de facto agency autonomy only in interaction
with other determinants, such as the age of the agency. Table 3 summarizes
the descriptive statistics for the control variables.
Results
In order to put the differentiation hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) and the
context hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) to an empirical test, we investigate the
relationship between the degree of national agencies’ Europeanization and
their perceived autonomy with regard to policy implementation and
policy development. Moreover, we test whether these relationships are
robust across different national contexts. The regression analyses were
performed using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. For all
dependent variables, we report the full models including all control vari-
ables, but we also estimated a baseline model (including the country
dummy for cross-country analyses) as well as separate models for each
set of control variables (baseline model plus structure, task, and culture
variables, respectively).
The Effects of Europeanization on National Agencies’
Policy-Implementation Autonomy
Table 4 reports the regression analyses estimating the effects of European-
ization on policy-implementation autonomy. The models show that the
TABLE 3
Control Variables
N Min Max Mean SD
Context
Country (0 = GER, 1 = NL) 209 0 1 0.66 0.475
Structure
Legal type (dummy) 209 0 1 0.69 0.462
Single/group organization
(0 = single organization,
1 = group organization)
209 0 1 0.25 0.436
Task
Regulation (dummy) 209 0 1 0.34 0.476
Other types of exercising public
authority (dummy)
209 0 1 0.22 0.415
General public services (dummy) 209 0 1 0.57 0.496
Economic policy (COFOG) 209 0 1 0.32 0.466
Social and welfare policy (COFOG) 209 0 1 0.39 0.488
Budget 197 0.00 43,680.00 562.08 3,787.950
Culture
Age 203 0.00 202.00 28.82 36.070
Notes: We use the standardized agency budget instead of the total agency budget to correct
for the difference in size of the two countries.
SD, standard deviation.
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degree of Europeanization does not affect agency discretion regarding the
selection of either policy instruments or target groups.10 This finding is
corroborated in the control models (not reported), where no significant
effect of Europeanization on policy-implementation autonomy can be
discerned.
However, the models indicate that some of the control variables have a
significant effect on policy-implementation autonomy. Most importantly,
in both models, legally autonomous agencies have significantly higher
levels of autonomy than semiautonomous agencies. Furthermore, agen-
cies that have “other types of exercising public authority” within their task
portfolio report significantly lower levels of autonomy than agencies with
other tasks. Moreover, agencies with large budgets have relatively low
discretion regarding their choice of target group (though this effect is
sensitive to outliers), whereas age has a positive effect on agency discre-
tion. These results are in line with the assumptions proposed in the litera-
ture. In contrast, the models do not support theoretical assumptions
concerning regulatory and service delivery agencies’ superior discretion
in policy implementation.
In terms of country differences, the target group model indicates lower
levels of autonomy for Dutch agencies. However, the control models show
that cross-national differences are only discernible when controlling for
agency structure. Additionally, whereas no country differences can be
TABLE 4
Policy-Implementation Autonomy (Full Models)
Policy Instruments Target Group
B (SE) β B (SE) β
Europeanization 0.003 (0.005) 0.070 0.001 (0.004) 0.021
Country −0.019 (0.062) −0.035 −0.105** (0.052) −0.190
Legal type 0.153** (0.069) 0.278 0.194*** (0.058) 0.342
Single/group organization 0.008 (0.054) 0.014 −0.057 (0.054) −0.092
Regulation 0.034 (0.052) 0.064 0.016 (0.046) 0.028
Other types of exercising
public authority
−0.102* (0.056) −0.171 −0.098* (0.052) −0.158
General public services −0.033 (0.046) −0.063 0.008 (0.045) 0.015
Economic policy 0.017 (0.058) 0.032 0.084 (0.053) 0.148
Social and welfare policy 0.030 (0.057) 0.057 0.034 (0.054) 0.064
Budget −0.023 (0.041) −0.102 −0.043** (0.022) −0.182
Age 0.001 (0.001) 0.080 0.001* (0.001) 0.128
(Constant) 0.577*** (0.079) 0.542*** (0.072)
R2 (adjusted) .066 .088
F-statistics 1.987** 2.236**
N 154 164
Notes: * p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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found in the full model estimating agency discretion regarding instru-
ment choice, two control models (baseline and culture) indicate signifi-
cantly higher levels of agency autonomy along this dimension in the
Netherlands. In total, the results regarding country differences in terms of
policy-implementation autonomy are mixed, and these differences are
mediated by structural characteristics. Moreover, the size of the country
effect is rather small in all models.
To assess the context hypothesis more thoroughly, we also conducted
separate regressions per country. Again, we did not find a significant effect
of Europeanization on agency autonomy in any of these models. Thus, the
analyses corroborate the differentiation hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), accord-
ing to which the degree of national agencies’ Europeanization has no effect
on their policy-implementation autonomy. This finding is robust across
national contexts with different trajectories of agency reform and thus also
supports the context hypothesis (Hypothesis 2).
The Effects of Europeanization on National Agencies’
Policy-Development Autonomy
The previous analyses have shown that the degree of Europeanization has
no traceable effect on national agencies’ policy-implementation autonomy.
This finding corresponds to the differentiation hypothesis, which also
assumes a positive relationship among the degree of Europeanization and
national agencies’ policy-development autonomy. The empirical findings
on this relationship are presented in Table 5 (Germany) and Table 6 (the
Netherlands). We also report the baseline model and the control models
(structure, task, and culture) for this dependent variable. The main finding
is that the degree of Europeanization has a significant effect on national
agencies’ policy-development autonomy, even when controlling for
organizational characteristics. Moreover, the effect is observable in both
countries.
The models for the subsample of German agencies indicate a robust
effect of the degree of Europeanization on policy-development autonomy
(Table 5). While the coefficient of the explanatory variable is rather small,
it is significantly different from zero in all models, including robustness
tests in which potential outliers were excluded from the analysis. More-
over, modest effects are commonplace in this kind of research, which
indicates that explanations of perceived agency autonomy have to con-
sider various explanatory factors (Verhoest et al. 2010). The analysis sug-
gests that Europeanization clearly deserves attention as an explanation,
particularly when it comes to policy-development autonomy. A closer
look at the data reveals modest levels of multicollinearity (well below
standard rules of thumb) between the Europeanization variable and legal
type, regulation, general public services, and the policy sector dummies.11
In other words, the Europeanization of national agencies varies across
structural and task characteristics, partially elucidating the modest effects









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF EUROPEANIZATION 17
of the explanatory variable. Moreover, this limited overlap among the
explanatory variables expounds the modest proportion of explained vari-
ance, especially in the full model. More generally, these findings suggest
that explanatory factors that could not be included in the statistical models
might provide better explanations for policy-development autonomy.
However, this article aims at investigating the effects of Europeanization
on agency autonomy rather than at maximizing the explained variance
in agency autonomy, and the Europeanization variable has the largest
standardized coefficient in all models. Furthermore, with the exception
of budget size, the degree of Europeanization is the only indepen-
dent variable with a statistically significant effect on policy-development
autonomy.12
The results of the Dutch subsample closely resemble the previous find-
ings (Table 6). Again, the analyses indicate a statistically significant effect
of Europeanization on national agencies’ policy-development autonomy
in all models, and these effects also persist when excluding unusual cases.
The effect size is rather small, but again the Europeanization variable
coefficient has the largest standardized coefficient in all models. The data
also display a modest degree of multicollinearity between Europeaniza-
tion and agency structure (single/group organization), regulatory tasks,
and the policy sector dummies.13 Thus, the analysis reveals varying
degrees of Europeanization among the agency population that must be
taken into account when drawing inferences from cross-sectional data. In
other words, the findings indicate that appropriate control variables have
been selected.
In conclusion, all models clearly support the differentiation hypothesis
(Hypothesis 1): The degree of Europeanization does not affect national
agencies’ implementation autonomy, but it has a positive effect on national
agencies’ policy-development autonomy. The results also support the
context hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), which stipulates that these effects (or
the lack thereof) are robust across national contexts with different patterns
of agencification.
Discussion
The analysis shows that the differentiated nature of the EU policymaking
process has a differentiated impact on the autonomy of national agencies.
The article therefore adds important insights to the literature concerning
the domestic impact of the EU integration process on relationships
within national administrative systems (Bach and Ruffing 2013; Egeberg
2006; Newman 2008; Yesilkagit 2011). Using the classic principal–agent
approach, we assumed that national agencies gain expert and negotiation
knowledge when becoming involved in European networks. This involve-
ment increases the monitoring and control costs for parent ministries,
especially because networks provide agencies with new channels of
influence on European policymaking that they can use to bypass their
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parent ministry (Egeberg 2006). The national agencies’ participation in
international policymaking settings thus affects their role in policy-
making, arguably making it harder for parent ministries to exclude agen-
cies from policy design. This applies not only to policies originating at the
supranational level, but also to domestic policies: Nowadays, there is
hardly any policy area in EU member states that is not affected by EU
legislation. Moreover, even if national agencies’ involvement in EU admin-
istrative networks (broadly defined) were the result of deliberate delega-
tion by parent ministries rather than some kind of agency drift, the
analysis shows that Europeanization leads to a shift in the relationship
between ministries and agencies, or more generally speaking, between
politics and administration.
Second, as expected by our theoretical approach, we found no effect of
Europeanization on implementation autonomy. As discussed above,
parent ministries cannot be bypassed in implementation because binding
implementation decisions are made at the national and not the European
level. Therefore, additional negotiation and expert knowledge is less valu-
able for gaining autonomy in implementation. All in all, we suspect that
this kind of autonomy is more a function of other types of determinants
than is agency participation in international administrative networks. For
instance, the statistical models indicate significant effects of agency struc-
ture, task, and culture on implementation autonomy. There are other well-
known explanatory factors, such as agency leadership and issue dynamics
(e.g., sudden crisis), that could not be tested with cross-sectional data at
the organizational level (see also Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008). However,
these issues lie beyond the scope of this article, which aims to explain the
consequences of agencies’ involvement in European networks. Moreover,
internationally comparative research indicates that agencies generally
have high levels of implementation autonomy, whereas there are clear
differences for other dimensions, such as management autonomy
(Verhoest et al. 2010). Although national agencies can gain bureaucratic
autonomy due to the availability of superior knowledge (e.g., “best prac-
tices”) in a transnational network (Newman 2008; Yesilkagit 2011), our
analysis indicates that under conditions of high discretionary authority,
this “network effect” does not lead to further autonomy gains in policy
implementation.
Third, the analysis underlines the fact that, as suggested by organiza-
tional approaches, structural disaggregation to agencies—be they newly
created, modern agencies or long-standing—provides fertile ground for a
stronger role of the bureaucracy in policymaking. In the Netherlands, the
NPM-inspired agencification was intended to bring about more agency
autonomy, especially in terms of policy implementation. However, even
though ministry–agency relations in Germany are characterized by strong
formal hierarchies, agencies generally have large degrees of discretion in
operational matters (Bach 2010). More surprisingly, agency involvement in
policy formulation in the Netherlands has been an important element
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of administrative reforms (e.g., through feasibility tests), whereas in
Germany, agencies do not systematically take part in policy formulation,
their involvement being a function of statutory tasks, political salience,
and agency leadership, among others (Bach 2012). Thus, our findings
indicate that whether policy formulation is considered a core agency activ-
ity or not, agency exposure to transnational administrative networks
increases their role in policymaking.
Finally, the analysis also adds to the literature on independent regula-
tory agencies (Gilardi 2002; Maggetti 2007). The empirical results con-
sistently show that regulatory agencies do not report higher levels of
policy-implementation autonomy in comparison to agencies with other
tasks. Maybe regulatory agencies are not so different from other agencies,
after all, when it comes to policy-implementation autonomy. However, the
analysis shows that formal structure (i.e., legal type) matters for perceived
agency autonomy in policy implementation. The assumption that efficient
implementation of regulatory policies requires formal autonomy is often
assumed, but rarely tested empirically. Yet the analysis indicates that regu-
latory agencies may indeed be more strongly involved in policy formula-
tion than are agencies with other tasks, at least in the Netherlands.
Conclusion
National administrative systems are currently undergoing rapid change
under the influence of internationalization. What was once the firm
ground of diplomats and foreign affairs departments has now become the
core jurisdictions of a growing number of departments that used to be
confined to dealing with national policies (Geuijen et al. 2008). At the same
time, national administrative systems are themselves under the influence
of internationalization trends. This trend has most notably seen the
emergence of public management reforms, including the creation of
semiautonomous agencies. Together, both developments have led to an
evolution of new modes of governance in which the national and interna-
tional domains have become much more intertwined. The emergence of
transgovernmental networks is one important answer to the complexities
of governing in an internationalizing world. Internationalization cannot
persist without consequences, and this article has revealed that interna-
tionalization of policymaking leads to substantial shifts in the relationship
between politics and administration within national states. However,
these consequences are differentiated, as Europeanization has a much
stronger impact on the role of agencies in policymaking than on their
role in policy implementation. The increase of autonomy in policy develop-
ment fundamentally changes the role of agencies as they gain policy-
development powers that exceed their strict executive authority. They
become policy-developing actors that shape national policies without
being directly steered by their national political principals.
20 TOBIAS BACH, EVA RUFFING, AND KUTSAL YESILKAGIT
This article studied the case of the EU, but its outcomes have broader
implications. The differentiation between policymaking being transferred
to an international level and policy implementation being left at the national
level is a common feature of international organizations. Although many
decisions made in international organizations lack the effectiveness and
enforceability of EU law, agency networks are gaining ground in inter-
national organizations, too. The principals of these national agencies must
cope with international organizations that gain administrative capacities by
means of integrating national agencies into transnational networks.
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Notes
1. We verified sample representativeness for Germany and the Netherlands
using chi-square goodness-of-fit tests that compare the distribution of
specific agency characteristics among the population and the sample.
2. The relatively large number of agencies in the Netherlands can be explained
by the country’s unitary state structure. In Germany, which is federally
organized, many tasks are performed at the subnational level (see Bach and
Jann 2010 for an overview of the allocation of tasks among the different
levels of government).
3. To be sure, whereas the Europeanization index measures specific activities
carried out at the European level, the dependent variables measure agencies’
perceived autonomy in performing specific activities at the national level.
4. However, there still might be a difference between the perceived and the
actual autonomy of the agency. We would like to thank one of the anony-
mous reviewers for pointing this out to us.
5. Because several cases have missing values for either variable, the use of an
additive index would reduce the number of valid observations to N = 156.
The internal consistency of the items (α = 0.775) indicates that they are
closely interrelated.
6. This item has the following answer categories: 1 = not at all; 2 = to a small
extent; 3 = partly; 4 = to a large extent; 5 = to a very large extent.
7. This item has the following answer categories: 1 = not at all; 2 = somewhat,
but only ex post (e.g., ex post evaluations or feasibility tests); 3 = somewhat,
but ex ante (e.g., consultation or ex ante feasibility tests); 4 = frequently, we
are invited to participate in policymaking from the beginning; 5 = always,
because we often initiate new policymaking ourselves.
8. The dummy variables in the multivariate models indicate whether the
organization has any of these specific tasks within its overall portfolio.
9. The policy sector variables are based on the United Nations’ “Classification
of Functions of Government” (COFOG) (see Verhoest et al. 2010 for more
details).
10. The regression diagnostics (autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and distribu-
tion of residuals) for these models indicate that all standard assumptions of
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linear regression analysis are fulfilled. Furthermore, all models were tested
for outliers by comparing these models with those excluding potentially
problematic cases. These analyses show that the significant effect of
“budget” on agency discretion regarding the choice of target group disap-
pears upon excluding potential outliers.
11. The average variance inflation factor (VIF) ranges between 1.005 (culture
model) and 1.526 (full model).
12. The effect of budget size on the dependent variables is not statistically
significant from zero when excluding the agency with the largest budget
from the sample (full model, task model).
13. The average VIF ranges between 1.000 (culture model) and 1.350 (full
model).
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